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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FLOYD WEBSTER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
MARY and CHARLES LEHMER,

Appeal No. 19339

Defendant-Appellants.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Lehmers Reaffirm Their Statement of The Facts.
Appellants Mary and Charles Lehmer ("Lehmers") reject

Respondent Floyd Webster's ("Webster") statement of the facts
and reaffirm their reliance on the statement of the facts as set
forth in their opening brief. The Lehmers will not specifically
rebut each purported fact presented by Webster.

However, there

are three misstatements of fact which must be clarified.
Responses to those misstatements of fact are set out below.
2.

Webster Did Not Own the Property.
Webster admits at page 3 of his answering brief that the

record title to the property on which Webster had lived was in
Royal Street Land Company.

Webster goes beyond that fact and

attempts to convert the fact of his claim of ownership into the
the fact of ownership.

The issue of the fact of ownership by
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Webster was not before the trial court.
adjudicated.

That issue was never

At best, Webster had a contingent expectancy or the

basis for a good faith legal claim to title.
Mr. Huseth, the former president of Royal Streetf testified that the informal policy to sell land to squatters was not
based upon the squatter's legal rights but "on an emotional
thing."

(T 45-46).

Webster's claim to a legal title is not a

marketable title of any value until there has been a judicial
determination that the legal standard for an adverse possession
claim has been satisfied.

Anderson v. Osguthorpe, 504 P.2d 1000r

1002 (Utah 1972); Babo v. Bookbinders Financial Corp., 551 P.2d
63, 64, 27 Ariz. App. 73 (1976).
When the Lehmers purchased Webster's interest in the
property, subject to Webster's right to live on the property so
long as he desired, they only purchased Webster's contingent
expectancy or the right to stand in his place to assert a claim
to legal title.
would

probably

squatter

Webster admitted that the Royal Street policy
not apply

(T.164)

and

to a third party purchaser

Webster's

compliance

possession statute was at best speculative.

with

the

from a
adverse

The Lehmers pur-

chased an interest in property from Webster which could have and
may yet turn out to be illusory and of no value.

Lehmers in

effect purchased the opportunity to spend the time and money to
find out.
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3.

Webster Was Indifferent to the Ownership of His Property,
Webster's trial testimony clearly established that he

was indifferent to whether his land was owned by the BLM or Royal
Street,

Webster's attempt to obfuscate that fact at pages 5 and

6 of his answering brief is to no avail,

Webster's trial testi-

mony was merely a replay of his deposition testimony,
Q,

(By Mr, Gesas): But why didn't you go and see
if the BLM really owned the land, or if the
mining company owned it? Why didn't you do
that before you signed up with them [the
Lehmers]?

A.

I don't know. I never had no desire to find
out, I wasn't concerned.

(Webster 1/7/83 depo. p. 95)
4»

Webster Mistates His Relationship with the Lehmers,
Webster's statement of the facts and Webster's argument

are replete with attempts to turn a casual social relationship
between Webster and the Lehmers into a confidential relationship
in which Webster was the dependent party.

The facts as estab-

lished at trial and in Mr. Webster's deposition are all to the
contrary.
Q.

(By Mr. Campbell): Nowf at that timef Mr.
Webster, Mary Lehmer was not acting as your
lawyer, was she?

A.

No.

Q»

She hadn't acted as your lawyer, had she?

A.

No.

Q.

She wasn't acting as your business advisor,
was she?
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No.
Or your financial consultant, was she?
No.
She wasn't acting as your real estate advisor,
was she?
No.
She hadn't in the pastf had she?
No.
You weren't relying at that time on Mrs.
Lehmer for some confidential relationship,
were you?
Not that I recall, no.
168).
(By Mr. Gesas): Have you ever talked to her
[Mary Lehmer] in confidence, told her your
deepest secrets or feelings?
No.
And you didn't go to her after the death of
your wife, or go to Charles Lehmer and seek
advice from them about your daily affairs
with things you were doing in your life,
did you?
No.
You didn't go ask Mary or Charles how to
buy or sell property or get groceries or
how to run your life, did you?
No.
And you weren't relying on them for advice
in your everyday affairs, were you?
No.
You were old enough and capable of taking
care of yourself, weren't you, before October
of 1980?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A,

Yes.

Q.

And after?

A.

Still am.

Q.

Thank you. Were Charles or Mary Lehmer your
advisors before October 7, 1980 and after
the death of your wife? Were you looking
to them for any kind of advice?

A.

No.

(Webster 1/7/83 depo. p. 106-107)
5.

Lehmers1 References to the Published Depositions Are
Proper.
Webster concedes at page 17 of his answering brief that

all depositions were published yet claims that they are "nonevidentiary matters".

Webster cites no rule or case law in support

of his claim that depositions ordered by the Court to be published are not evidence in that proceeding.

In the case at barr

the depositions were ordered published at a pretrial conference
and the trial court noted during trial that in fact the depositions had been published.

(T. 238, 419; R. 301).

Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets out
certain specific circumstances under which depositions may be
used at trial or upon a hearing of a motion.

A party's right to

use depositions for those purposes is founded upon the rules and
a party need not secure special permission from the trial court
for the use of the depositions for the purposes outlined in Rule
32.

A party also need not request that the depositions be

"published" to avail itself of that rule.
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The publication of a deposition is a different matter.
Upon an order of publication, the sealed copy of the deposition
filed with the Court pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure is opened and the deposition becomes a part of
the record of the proceeding.

It is clear from this Court's

reference to the use of published depositions in cases such as
Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474, 477-478 (Utah
1979) that once a deposition is ordered published in a particular
proceeding, in Farrow it was a motion for summary judgment, the
deposition is "before the court".

The published deposition is an

evidentiary matter on which the trial court may rely in entering
its findings and on which the Supreme Court may rely in reviewing
the proceeding below.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY
ON FAIR MARKET VALUE WAS IMPROPER.
Webster's answering brief fails to separately address
the appellants' two points of error concerning the trial court's
admission of testimony on fair market value.

Webster presents

only a generalized discussion of some of the prerogatives of a
trial court in an equitable proceeding in an apparent attempt to
establish the relevance of the challenged testimony.
totally

ignores Lehmers1

claim of error with respect

Webster
to the

admission of the testimony of fair market value of the subject
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"squatters rights" without proper foundation.

That issue pre-

sents a question of competency and foundationf not relevancy.
An expert's testimony cannot be based on facts which are
contrary to the evidence.

See, Great Western Sugar v. Northern

Natural Gas, 661 P.2d 684, 694 (Colo. App. 1982);
415 P.2d 332, 337 (Colo. 1966).

Liber v. Flor,

In Liber, the Colorado Supreme

Court concluded that certain expert testimony was incompetent and
"should not have been admitted into evidence" because "the opinion in question was based on at least two purported facts that
Summers [the expert] assumed to be true but which were not substantiated

by the testimony of other witnesses or other evi-

dence." JId.

In Chicago and North Western Railway v. Hillard, 502

P.2d 189, 192 (Wyo. 1972), the Wyoming Supreme Court held that
"the record must show sufficient facts upon which the judgment
and opinion of an expert were based.

A witness who asserts an

opinion on the value of property not supported by facts is not
competent; . . . ."
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the admissability
of expert testimony "depends in large measure upon the foundation
laid.

The expertise of the witness, his degree of familiarity

with the necessary facts, and the logical nexus between his opinion and the facts adduced must be established."
Didericksen,

597

P.2d

1328,

1331

(Utah

1979);

Edwards v.
Highland

Construction Co. v. Union Pacific RR. No. 17990, filed February
3, 1984, P.11.
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Webster

only

tangentially

addresses

the question of

relevancy and ignores completely the question of competency and
foundation.
without

The expert testimony of Mr, Pia was incompetent and

proper

foundation

because

it

lacked

the

necessary

"logical nexus" between any facts either asserted by Webster or
proved at trial.

Mr. Pia's opinion as to the fair market value

of Webster1 s squatter's rights on October 7, 1980 was based on
the erroneous assumption that Webster owned a fee simple interest
on that date.

Questions of competency and foundation are fun-

damental to the rules of evidence and the reliable, fair and
efficient operation of the judicial system.

Webster's generali-

zations about the rules of equity provide no basis whatsoever for
abandoning the well established rules of evidence.
POINT II
WEBSTER'S UNILATERAL MISTAKES DID NOT
JUSTIFY RECISSION OF THE CONTRACT.
Websterr

in his answering brief, focuses on a single

incident in the course of the transaction between Webster and the
Lehmers and attempts to justify Webster's lack of due diligence.
Even if the Court were to give credence to Webster's recitation
of the facts surrounding the October 7, 1980 agreement, Webster
still fails to take into account the subsequent events.
on

three

separate

occasions

after

that

date

Webster

reaffirmed

ratified the agreement by seeking payments pursuant to it.

and
In

addition, Webster entered into a modified agreement on December
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21, 1980 which reaffirmed the original agreement and relinquished
his life estate.
During the entire period of time between October 7, 1980
and December

21, 1980, Webster was free from any influence of

the Lehmersf assuming there had been any to begin withf and could
have

investigated

the status of his land prior to the various

reaffirmations of the agreement.
when

it

finally

agreement,
Summit

did

Webster

County

occur

was

quick

to determine

1/7/83 depo. p. 49-50).

to

The evidence is also clear that
him

to

to attempt

travel

to

to rescind

the

the

courthouse

the status of his land.

in

(Webster

It is also clear, even under the version

of the facts stated by Webster, that during this period he was
living

with Mary Dudley

desolate

figure

Webster

in Heber City and was not the lonely,
makes

himself

out

to

be.

(T. 181,

283-284; Webster 1/7/83 depo. p. 103-104).
Webster
diligence

in determining

irrelevant.
Webster's

attempts

to dismiss

his

33 years of

lack of

the status of his property as somehow

It is clearly relevant to demonstrate the fact of

lack of diligence

and

it is also relevant to demon-

strate that any lack of due diligence by Webster at the time of
the original October 7, 1980 transaction and subsequent to it was
simply part of the continuing pattern of indifference on his part
and not the result of any pernicious

influence exerted by the

Lehmers.
Webster has no response at all to Lehmers1

claim that

Webster1s ignorance of the status of his property is irrelevant
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because there is simply no evidence of reliance upon this alleged
misinformation.

The evidence is clear from Webster1s own testi-

mony that even if he had known his property was not on BLM land
it would not have made any difference.

In his own wordsf he just

"didn't care" whether or not his property was on BLM land.

(T.

146-148).
POINT III
THE ALLEGED MUTUAL MISTAKE
DOES NOT WARRANT RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT.
Webster's argument concerning the alleged mutual mistake
requires only a brief response as all the relevant issues are
fully explicated in Point III of Lehmers1 opening brief.
Webster claims that rescission is appropriate because
the contract created a "hostile marriage" between Lehmers' and
Webster's children.

This is a wholly new argument raised for the

first time on appeal and not properly cognizable by this Court.
Nelson v. Newmany 583 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1978); Simpson v.
General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 1970); Hamilton et
al. v. Salt Lake County Sewerage Imp. Dist., 390 P.2d 235, 236
(Utah 1964) •

In addition, there is simply no evidence in the

record to support this claim.
evidence are clear.

The reasons for the lack of any

The issue was never raised before the trial

court and it is simply not relevant to this lawsuit.
Webster further claims that this alleged mutual mistake
justifies rescission because "severance of the joint tenancy was
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a condition precedent" to Webster receiving the purchase price
for his money.

It is clear from the testimony from Mary Lehmer

that she is prepared to proceed with the transaction whether
Webster has the rights of a joint tenant or a tenant-in-common,
(T.

303-304).

Even if the Court were to assume this was a con-

dition precedent, it is subject to waiver by the Lehmers, and
clearly the Lehmers have waived the condition.

Therefore, even

if there was a condition precedent, it makes no difference to the
question of whether rescission is appropriate based upon this
alleged mutual mistake.
POINT IV
WEBSTER FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE
OF A FIDUCIARY OR CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP.
Utah has well developed case law on the standards for
determining the existence of a confidential relationship.

That

case law is discussed and analyzed in light of the facts of this
case in Lehmers1 opening brief. Webster's ignores this Utah law.
Rather, Webster simply cites a string of legal authorities on
various theories not applicable to this appeal.
Among the citations set out by Webster are references to
unconscionable contracts and constructive fraud.

The issues of

unconscionability and constructive fraud were not presented at
trial and they are not a proper subject for appeal.
supra; Simpson, supra.

Wilson,

Further, Webster does not advance these

references as separate legal theories on which he bases his
claims for relief.
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In summary, Point IV of Webster's answering brief is
an eclectic presentation of general legal principles which are
not related to the facts of this case.

Webster provides no use-

ful argument in response to the arguments and analysis presented
in Lehmers' opening brief on the issue of the existence of a confidential relationship.
POINT V
THIS COURT NEED NOT GIVE ANY SPECIAL
DEFERENCE TO THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT.
The Trial Court's findings on contractual capacity, confidential relationship and the appropriateness of rescission as a
remedy for the alleged unilateral and mutual mistakes are contrary to well established Utah law.

The questions at issue in

this appeal essentially involve the application of the facts in
this case to the lawf which are legal questions.

The Utah

Supreme Court does not accord the trial court's conclusions on
questions of law the same deference as accorded findings of fact.
This Court must make its own independent determination of the
relevant legal issues. Betenson v. Call Automobile and Equipment
Sales, 645 P.2d

684f

686

(Utah 1982); Provo City Corp. v.

Nielsen Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1982).

s

C O N C L U S I O N
Webster has attempted to piece together isolated, unrelated and undocumented pieces of evidence to demand that a valid
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contract be voided.
the law.

His demand is not supported by the facts or

The common thread in all of Webster's claims and legal

theories is that after voluntarily entering into a valid contract
he decided that he could have made a better deal.

Webster has

failed to prove that the agreement was unfair or that any legal
or equitable basis exists for rescinding the contract.

The law

of contracts would be a shambles of every contracting party could
back out of an agreement by the simple telling of a story of imagined woe.

Webster is a capable adult member of society who is

bound to his word and his contractsf as are we all.
Respectfully submitted,

of and for
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main St.f Suite 1200
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellants
Mary Lehmer and Charles Lehmer
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